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THE EXPEDITION TO DARKEST GENEVA
Robert E. Hudec*
At the end of 1964, I was serving as Assistant General Counsel in
the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (STR),
as it was then known. STR was a new agency, having been organized in
early 1963. It had a professional staff of only fourteen persons, with
only two lawyers-the General Counsel John Rehm and myself. With
this tiny staff, STR was charged with (1) conducting the Kennedy
Round Trade Negotiations in GATT, and (2) managing all other GATT
business as well.
In those days, research in GATT law was an art more than a craft.
The text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, some fifty or
so pages of reasonably detailed legal prose, was, of course, the critical
source document. The importance of this text was magnified by the fact
that there were no readily available materials about its negotiating his-
tory and the way it had been administered over the fifteen-odd years
since it came into force. The State Department archives did have a com-
plete set of the documents generated by the GATT/ITO negotiations and
by the GATT itself. But there was no index to guide one to where, if at
all, the subject in question had been treated. The only way to go behind
or beyond the text of the GATT agreement was to find someone who
was able to recall something about what had happened on this subject.
Fortunately, the State Department Legal Advisor's office had an attor-
ney named Walter Hollis who had been involved with GATT affairs
since the 1940s, and who was a walking data base on GATT history.
Research usually began, therefore, by asking Walter Hollis. If Walter
did not know, the next step was to find one of the other GATT veterans
in the State Department's diplomatic corps who did. If there was time,
help might also be obtained from the international civil servants in the
GATT Secretariat, many of whom had served since the time GATT had
been negotiated. The telephone was the principal research tool.
The key to survival for those government lawyers who were respon-
sible for GATT law was the fact that GATT itself seldom stopped to
worry about legal issues. There was no lawyer on the staff of the GATT
Secretariat, and the Secretary General (Sir Eric Wyndham-White, a
lawyer by training) was committed to the view that GATT did not need
one. The government representatives and international civil servants
who ran the GATT's business seldom stopped to ask whether this or
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that decision or procedure was legal. It was enough that there was a
consensus to do what needed to be done. Governments did prepare and
sign elaborate protocols to record the results of negotiations, but all
these documents gathered dust in a storeroom in the basement of the
GATT headquarters-then located in the Villa Bocage on the grounds
of the Palais des Nations in Geneva.
It was either in late 1964 or early 1965 that John Jackson, then a
member of the Boalt Hall law faculty, paid a visit to the STR offices in
Washington. I do not remember the exact date, and John does not even
remember the visit at all. John stopped in my office, and informed me
that he was going to spend the spring and summer of 1965 in Geneva
researching the law of GATT. I do not remember the details of the con-
versation very well. John probably told me that he had arranged with the
Secretariat to take quarters in the Villa Bocage and to have access to all
GATT documents during his stay. I may have told John I was planning
to do the same thing myself the year following. I recall that John asked
some questions, but I cannot remember what they were. Looking back, I
have come to regard this brief meeting as a sort of having-been-there-at-
the-creation. If I had known what was to come of it, I would have taken
a picture.
My plans to spend a year in Geneva did come together in the Spring
of 1965. Having secured the necessary research grant and a teaching
position to start in the Fall of 1966, I left STR in July or August and
arrived in Geneva in September. John had gone back to the United
States by then. Needless to say, I had been following John's progress
during my several visits to Geneva earlier in the year. I do not remem-
ber whether I actually saw John during those visits, but either from John
or others I learned that he had been working prodigiously. I recall being
told that John would leave the Villa Bocage every evening with an
armload of bound volumes containing GATT documents, apparently to
continue reading them late into the night. (Needless to say, this was
considered extraordinarily deviant behavior by most of those officials
who inhabited the "lotus land" that was diplomatic Geneva of that era.)
I do have a recollection of either John saying, or a Secretariat official
quoting John as saying, "There's so much to read and so little time to do
it."
At some point, I learned that the goal of John's 1965 research visit
to Geneva had been to collect and organize all of the "law" of the Gen-
eral Agreement into a systematic treatise. I do recall one conversation-
it must have been with John himself-when he took delight in explain-
ing the system of index cards by which he could organize and access
every subject within the large volume of research notes he was taking.
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(It may have been the system involving metal rods passed through
punch holes in the cards.) The more I became familiar with the extent of
GATT documentation that had to be covered, the more improbable it
began to seem that John would be able to accomplish this goal in the
limited time available to him. Working at a steady (albeit not prodi-
gious) pace myself, it was taking me a full year to assemble and
understand the data pertaining to the history and jurisprudence of GATT
dispute settlement procedures alone. I recall hearing that John had re-
turned to Geneva over one or more summers, but even so ....
Having had the unique perspective of being the only other legal
scholar to have excavated GATT's legal archives at the time, I think I
can say that no one in the entire world was more astounded to see the
publication of John's treatise in 1969 than was I. In those few years, a
book half that size would have been a gigantic accomplishment. That it
should be not only so comprehensive but also so consistently percep-
tive, accurate, and informative is still difficult to believe.
It is difficult to overstate the impact of the treatise. Of course it was
a godsend to those lawyers, mainly government lawyers, who actually
had to give legal opinions about GATT law. As one who practiced a bit
of GATT law "B.J." (Before Jackson), I can attest to the enormous ad-
vantage of having this book for research purposes.
The impact of the treatise goes well beyond its contribution to
GATT legal research, however. First and foremost, the treatise demon-
strated to the world that the experience of the GATT was a coherent
body of international law. It has long been a characteristic of interna-
tional legal scholarship that scholars make law by finding it. Like those
who speak prose without knowing it, governments tend to engage in
legal behavior without treating it as such. They write agreements, they
administer them, they follow regular patterns of behavior, and they con-
sistently try to make each other's behavior conform to the norms and
precedents created by all this activity. All the while, governments avoid
any appearance of commitment to a binding legal system. It takes a
work like John Jackson's treatise to concretize this sort of informal legal
behavior, and, in doing so, to make it possible for this activity to move
to a higher level of conscious commitment to effective legal institutions.
The evolution of the GAIT/WTO legal system over the past thirty
years has followed the developmental path just described. No one would
argue that John Jackson's treatise was the sole cause of this develop-
ment. In one sense the evolution of that legal system was probably
inevitable, because that is the way most social institutions evolve when
they are perceived to be useful. But no one can question that the Jackson
treatise did exert a decisive influence on the speed and direction of that
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development. A research tool usually needs to be updated. A book
which serves this more important foundational function achieves its
objective on the basis of the first edition alone.
Interestingly, the Jackson treatise arrived on the scene during the
high point of what became known as the "anti-legalist" movement in
GATT. This was a period from the early 1960s to about 1970 when the
leading GATT governments-chiefly the United States, the European
Community and the United Kingdom-became attached to the view that
legal claims were not the way to solve trade conflicts, and that only
diplomatic negotiation could reconcile the underlying social and eco-
nomic interests that gave rise to such conflicts. In my view, the reason
for the emergence of this anti-legalist position was that GATT needed a
legal "time-out" in order to accommodate the demands of its new de-
veloping country membership to the manifest imperfections of
developed country trade policy behavior. Likewise, the anti-legalist pe-
riod ended when two things happened: when the developing countries
did lower their expectations to a more "realistic" level, and when the
United States realized it needed a working legal system in order to at-
tack the growing problem of non-tariff trade barriers.
The Jackson treatise was written during the peak years of the anti-
legalist movement. The author clearly had that movement in mind as he
wrote. Chapter 29 contains a long and detailed critique of the
"negotiation" methods favored by the anti-legalists, and of the power-
based diplomacy that usually comes with it. Even more effective, per-
haps was the fact that the book as a whole was a personal declaration of
the author's belief in the value of the contrary position-a rule-oriented
system of governance. Even if one recognizes that other forces were
already at work bringing the anti-legalist period to an end, it must be
admitted that the Jackson treatise did arrive at exactly the right time-if
not to persuade governments to change course, then at least to provide a
splendid tool for those governments that were, for whatever reason,
seeking to revive and strengthen the GATT legal system.
Of course, it all happened a long time ago.
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